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INTRODUCTION
TRADE POLICY: THE NORMATIVE DIMENSION
LEA BRILMAYER*
Does trade policy have a normative dimension? We
don't usually think of the issue in those terms. Other foreign
policy issues do; human rights, development assistance, the
conduct of war, and many other areas of foreign affairs are
clearly perceived and discussed in moral terms. Should the
United States intervene in Bosnia? Does it have a moral obli·
gation to work toward nuclear disarmament? What sort of
economic assistance does it owe to struggling nations of the
Third World? What are its obligations to persons fleeing
political persecution in other countries? The moral dimen·
sion in these and many other areas of international concern
is evident.
Trade policy, though, has largely escaped the attention
of moral critics. It is perceived largely in technical terms, as
though the only issues were economic ones to be worked out
by economists and political scientists. It is certainly true that
there are important and interesting technical issues to be ad·
dressed. But the interest of trade policy for positive econo·
mists is not a reason to declare trade policy off limits to those
with a normative bent. Tax policy, welfare policy, and health
care raise technical economic issues, but are nonetheless of
interest (indeed, of great interest) to a broader community.
Policy, after all, is too important to be left to technicians, no
matter how valuable the contributions of technicians may be.
Normative analysis helps to set the goals that technical analy-
sis sets out to help us reach.
Argument over trade policy involves more unexamined
normative assumptions than one might at first think. The
single most important question is, what is the goal (or goals)
of trade policy? The reason that this question is not openly
debated is probably that people are so strongly committed to
their notions of what trade policy is for that they do not fo-
cus explicitly on the possibility that someone else might have
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a different idea of trade policy's goals. It seems to be as-
sumed that there is consensus on this issue, although in fact
there is not. This fact probably accounts for the way that the
debate seems oddly disconnected, for the way that the debat-
ers don't seem to join issue. With different sides having dif-
ferent objectives in mind, it should not be surprising that
they often seem to be talking past one another; and until the
normative issues are brought out into the open, and explicit
attention focused upon them as the true cause of disagree-
ment, little progress will be made.
The contributions to this symposium help to state and
clarify the normative issues that account for a substantial
part of the disagreement over trade policy in contemporary
American politics. Each of the authors has contributed a dis-
tinctive normative point of view. The importance of these
perspectives to the current debate over matters such as the
North American Free Trade Agreement or our trade deficit
with japan will emerge in the articles that follow. Here, I
want merely to outline some of the key issues that the articles
address.
First, even if one limits attention to economic interests,
as narrowly defined, there is room for disagreement over
whose economic interests to take into account. james Bo-
vard sets out the argument that it is the economic interests of
individuals, as those individuals themselves define their inter-
ests, that ought to matter. His argument builds on essen-
tially libertarian premises about the government's very lim-
ited right to intervene in the lives of its citizens. When a
government bars certain sorts of imports, or places a tariff
on them (so that some citizens cannot afford to buy those
imports), it is interfering with the citizen's freedom to con-
tract with the sellers of his or her own choice. It does so to
protect politically favored interest groups that have lobbied
for the right to pick consumers' pockets.
Thomas Howell sets out the opposing normative view
with equal force. It is a mistake, he says, to think of trade
policy in terms of competition amongst domestic interest
groups. The japanese do not think of trade policy in terms
of whether it hurts domestic consumers in order to benefit
domestic manufacturers; they think, instead, of promoting
the national interest as a whole. Having strong domestic in-
dustry is good for the country, and this is the perspective
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that we ought to adopt. In sharp contrast to Bovard's argu-
ments, which are radically individualistic, Howell thinks of
the good of the group and resists even posing the question of
how some members of the group might benefit from particu-
lar policy choices more than others.
What Bovard and Howell have in common, however, is
that they focus on the interests ofAmerican citizens. Howell
does so explicitly, with his emphasis on the national interest.
Bovard is less explicit; he merely phrases his argument pri-
marily in terms ofAmerican buyers wishing to trade with for-
eign manufacturers (although he could easily expand his ar-
gument to include explicitly the claim that foreign buyers
ought to be able to trade with the sellers of their choice, as
well). But two of the other authors look to the interests of
citizens of other nations directly. David Trubek and Martin
Wolfraise the issue of the impact of U.S. trade policy on de-
veloping nations. The problem is that developing nations
are now being shut out of U.S. markets.
There is, of course, a sharp irony here. The United
States has for many years considered itself a supporter of in-
ternational development, contributing technical as well as fi-
nancial assistance to Third World nations. Of course, for-
eign aid comes at a price, especially a political price, during
difficult economic times; some Americans tend to think that
it is better to spend money on local problems and to let the
world's poorer nations take care of their own, even though in
absolute terms their need is much greater. The impression
that this attitude creates is not attractive. It feeds the claims
of those who would argue that the United States prefers
Third World subservience. It is fine for poorer nations to
come to Washington with a begging bowl, looking for hand-
outs. The handouts come with strings attached, and the
price that poorer nations pay can be substantial, both in tan-
gible and symbolic terms.
But just let the Third World threaten (even slightly
threaten) American economic dominance, and all hell breaks
loose. Yet American economic dominance, as Edward Wolff
argues, is an unnatural state of affairs; it is only to be ex-
pected that once the immediate post World War II period
was over, other nations would start to catch up. It is futile to
try to maintain the American advantage indefinitely. At any
rate, Third World nations don't want welfare; they want jobs.
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They want to be allowed to compete with pride, as equals,
and it is exactly that opportunity that U.S. trade policy seems
to deny them.
The traditional economic analysis thatJagdish Bhagwati
describes attempts to show how the competition of interests
just described is more apparent than real. According to the
usual argument, everyone benefits from the absence of trade
barriers. Individuals benefit, the nation as a whole benefits,
and citizens of other nations benefit when all devote them-
selves to their areas of comparative advantage. As Bhagwati
makes clear, there are some respects in which economics
predicts that advantages can be had from closing markets.
But these are exceptions to the general principle of compar-
ative advantage; and in fact, if not always in theory, it is
counterproductive to chase these minor and elusive effi-
ciency gains because the distortions that trade barriers pro-
duce are so substantial.
While most economists therefore continue to argue for
free trade, politicians are all too aware that there may be bet-
ter ways to get elected, or, in some cases, reelected. Even if
free trade is efficient, it can mean disruption of settled indus-
trial patterns and displacement of American workers when
other nations gain the comparative advantage in certain sec-
tors. If you are an elected representative from Michigan, it's
tempting to look after the interests of the American automo-
bile industry. This is especially true when the workers who
would benefit from free trade are not American voters and
when the American consumers who would benefit from
lower auto prices are not politically organized around this
particular issue. And so we find ourselves back at precisely
the question that Thomas Howell hoped we could leave be-
hind: the division of gains and losses among domestic inter-
est groups. Until we face directly the question of whose eco-
nomic interests our trade policy ought to serve - the na-
tional interest? consumer interests? the interests of
organized labor? the interests of one's political constituents?
the interests of developing nations? - we're not going to
have a particularly illuminating discussion.
These remarks have been directed to the question of
economic interests. But as a number of our authors have
pointed out, economic interests, narrowly defined, are not
the whole picture. At one time it might have been possible
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to address the question in solely economic terms, but in the
last few years it has become increasingly apparent that trade
policy is not an isolated issue area. The second set of issues
that must be addressed, then, is what values other than strict
economic advantage ought to be figured into the calculus.
Here, as with the question of whose economic interests
should matter, there is tremendous difference of opinion.
Perhaps the clearest clash of values concerns our com-
mitment to the democratic process. Free trade, obviously, is
a substantive value; it specifies what is the proper result,
rather than how decisions ought to be made. There is no
guarantee that American democratic institutions will reach
the conclusion that American interests are best pursued by
lowering barriers to trade. Indeed, as Robert Hudec argues,
there are some reasons to doubt that democracy will lead to
free trade; Hudec offers the example of the Smoot Hawley
tariffs, which had impeccable democratic credentials but
which turned out to be an economic nightmare. In more
modern times, the GATT and the "fast track" system seem
more predisposed to produce free trade results than usual
legislative processes. Noneconomic interests are not well ac-
comodated by existing institutions for resolution of trade
policy questions; this should not be too surprising, for these
institutions were not designed to accomodate such interests.
Noneconomic interests are therefore screened out to some
degree, when they might be far better represented in the
halls of Congress. The question, then, is whether and why
we should change our usual democratic processes for mak-
~ng decisions simply because the issue involved is trade pol-
Icy.
To some degree, the other noneconomic value issues
arise from this question of democratic process. For, there
are some values that we have decided (democratically) to
protect as a domestic matter but that are threatened by free
trade. The reason is that pursuing certain values can impose
costs on local manufacturers that make them less competitive
in a world that is not equally committed. Worker safety stan-
dards provide an excellent example. U.S. democratic
processes have concluded that getting goods at the cheapest
possible price matters less than ensuring a minimal level of
physical safety for the workers that produce those goods. If
this means that the United States is less well-positioned to
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sell its goods abroad (because our competitors' political de-
cision processes have come to a different conclusion), then
that is bad enough. But when U.S. made goods cannot com-
pete even within the U.S., this seems to be a much greater
threat to our safety standards, for it creates political pressure
to adjust those standards downward. It is also a threat to
local decision processes, in the sense that the United States
loses effective control over the local economy and local
working conditions.
One of the best current examples of this dynamic con-
cerns the costs of environmental protection. If we have high
environmental standards, this threatens to make American
goods uncompetitive in both local and domestic markets.
Konrad von Moltke's article discusses this problem. The
pressure to exclude goods manufactured in violation of
American environmental regulation (the ban on tuna caught
without adequate protection for dolphins, for instance) is un-
derstandable. Not only does exclusion protect local manu-
facturers who are required to comply with local environmen-
tal regulations; it also expresses our disapproval of environ-
mentally damaging policies in other nations. But it is
precisely this last point that is the mctior defect, as well as a
major attraction, of using trade policy as a tool of environ-
mental protection. For other nations do not take kindly to
our "foisting" our environmental ethic upon them. Here,
the "democratic process" argument returns with a ven-
geance. For other nations feel just as strongly about the
sanctity of the results of their own political process as we do
about the results of our own; they feel, as we do, that trade
policy intrudes on the sovereign right to make one's own de-
cisions without outside interference.
There are other values that free trade threatens. Some
countries are committed to maintaining a particular way of
life that, they feel, would be undermined by allowing unlim-
ited export of certain sorts of goods. Craig Merrilees men-
tions the opposition of some family farmers to the import of
products that can be produced more cheaply in other na-
tions. The opposition of Japanese rice farmers to rice im-
ports is a well known example; similarly, European farmers
resist oilseed imports. At stake is more than the strictly eco-
nomic protection local farmers would receive. Local farming
can be an important symbol of commitment to a traditional
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way of life, a way of preserving some part of the country's
traditional agrarian heritage. The argument recalls Thomas
Howell's claim that trade should be evaluated in terms of the
impact on a nation as a whole, not in terms of the effect on
narrow interest groups. For it suggests that there is a gen-
eral interest in preserving local culture which extends be-
yond the narrow economic benefit to certain sectors.
Jiro Tamura gives another example of the impact of
American trade policy on local sovereignty. Much has been
written, of course, about the causes of the large American
trade deficit 'withJapan, and some claim that a chief reason is
the structure ofJapanese markets, which makes it difficult for
American exporters to penetrate them. Tamura describes
the system of keiretsu, a corporate structure unique to Japan
which presents potential antitrust problems. If the United
States applies its law extraterritorially to commercial activi-
ties centered largely in Japan, it is intruding upon Japanese
business custom and violatingJapanese sovereignty. On the
other hand, American manufacturers find it extremely unfair
that (in their view) theJapanese have broad access to Ameri-
can markets while the Japanese do not return the favor.
Perhaps this point, of"trade fairness," is a good place to
conclude this introduction. Anyone who feels that the words
"morality" and "protectionism" don't belong in the same
sentence must deal with our irrepressible tendencies to
phrase the question of open markets in terms of basic fair-
ness. There is an intuitive reaction on the part of many peo-
ple that if the United States opens its markets, other coun-
tries should do the same. (The flip side-that the United
States has an obligation to open its markets when its trading
partners do-is not always as clearly stated.) Here the meta-
phor of "the level playing field" comes in. The economists'
assurances that the best strategy is to keep your markets
open even if your trading partners close theirs is no match
for this simple (simplistic?) sense of equity.
This introduction has only aimed to identify sketchily
some of the many normative issues that plague trade policy.
If the outline has been a mile wide, it has been just an inch
deep. It remains for the rest of this Symposium Issue to
plumb the depths of these questions, ifnot, in fact, to resolve
them.
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